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Introduction
This chapter outlines the provisions of Directive 95/46/EC with the use of personal data for medical research centrally in mind. The Directive makes no specific mention of medical research and, consequently, it contains no provisions for medical research as an explicitly delineated category. However, at times, the Directive refers to medical purposes (though medical research is not explicitly listed under this category) and there are provisions relating to the use of data relating to a person's health. It also refers to the use of personal data for scientific research or statistics. Consequently, this overview is an analytic construction from these related provisions together with any other of the Directive's provisions that could apply to medical research, including those of a wholly general nature that apply to any processing of personal data.
The overview that follows represents my personal view, rather than the collective view of the participants in the PRIVIREAL project. It is presented here for the benefit of the general reader and also because it might assist in understanding the questions that participants were asked to address for the purpose of gathering the information for the comparative analysis presented in Chapters 10 and 11.
Objective of the Directive
The purpose of Directive 95/46/EC is to enable the free flow of personal data from one European Union (EU) Member State to another for the purposes of the internal market by ensuring that fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals (in particular, privacy) are safeguarded (see Recitals 3 and 10 and Article 1(1)) and a high level of equivalent protection of these rights and freedoms is ensured in all the Member States (see Recitals 7 and 8). The Directive gives substance to and amplifies the fundamental rights and freedoms contained in the Council of Europe 1 Privireal Co-ordinator. , is sufficient to invalidate at least secondary Community Acts. 2 However, despite the fact that a commitment to fundamental rights and freedoms has subsequently been enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty of European Union (the `Treaty of Maastricht'), it must not be forgotten that the EU does not have competence to legislate for fundamental rights and freedoms for their own sakes. The legal basis of EC law generally lies in the aim of constructing a single European market (and the legal basis of the Directive lies specifically in the aspect of the single market referred to as `the internal market'). Thus, the competence of the EU to legislate to protect fundamental freedoms and rights only arises for the reason that this protection is deemed necessary for achieving the purposes of the single market. For this reason (as well as for the reason that the Directive is concerned in its attention to fundamental rights and freedoms not only to protect privacy but all fundamental rights and freedoms to the extent that they may be interfered with in the use of personal data) 3 it can be misleading to refer, as is often done, to the Directive as `the Privacy Directive'. Article 1(2) asserts that Member States shall not restrict or prohibit the free flow of personal data between themselves for reasons connected with the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. However, this does not mean that the Directive is essentially concerned with legislating a balance between fundamental rights and freedoms and economic objectives of the internal market or manually (see Articles 2(b) and 3(1); Recital 27). However, the Directive only covers manual processing if the data are part of or intended to be part of a `filing system' (see Article 3; Recital 15), which is defined as a `structured set of personal data which are accessible according to specific criteria' (see Article 2(c); Recitals 15 and 27). Member States may define these criteria (see Recital 27). The Directive also does not cover processing of personal data for purposes that fall outside of the scope of EC law or processing by a natural person for purely personal or household purposes (see Article 3 (2) 
Principles of Data Protection
Article 6(1) (see also Recital 28) lays down five principles of data protection, which are that personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully (see Article 6(1)(a)); collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes (which, according to Recital 28, must be determined at the time of collection of the data) and not further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes (see Article 6(1)(b)) as originally specified (see Recital 28); -adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are collected/further processed (see Article 6(1)(c)); not be kept in a personally identifiable form for longer than necessary for the purposes for which they were collected or (compatibly) further processed (see Article 6(1)(e)).
Article 6(2) requires Member States to impose responsibility for compliance with the data protection principles on the data controller (see also Recital 25).
Regarding the 2d principle, further processing for historical, statistical and scientific purposes is not incompatible provided that Member States provide appropriate safeguards (see Article 6(1)(b)), which `must, in particular, rule out the use of the data in support of measures or decisions regarding any particular individual' (see Recital 29). Regarding the 5t' principle, for these purposes and under appropriate safeguards, personal data may be kept for longer than necessary for the purposes for which it was originally collected (see Article 6.1(e)).
The i principle can be viewed broadly or narrowly. Viewed broadly, for processing to be lawful, all the requirements of the Directive imposed on processing must be complied with. Thus viewed, compliance with the 2d, 3`d, 4`s and 5`h principles is necessary to satisfy the 1u principle, as is compliance with Articles 7-21. Viewed narrowly, only some of the requirements for lawful processing under the Directive as a whole are requirements for lawful processing in relation to the 1 s` principle specifically, and the wording of Recitals 30-36 (in particular, Recital 31) suggests that these are the requirements of Articles 7 and 8, while Recital 38 suggests that the requirements of Articles 10 and 11 are the Directive's specific requirements of fair processing. However, whichever way the matter is viewed, satisfaction of the conditions specified under Article 7 `Criteria for Making Data Processing Legitimate' and Article 8 `Special Categories of Processing' (see below), cannot be taken to be sufficient to render processing lawful under the Directive as a whole. Articles 6-21 all set (where applicable, given the nature of the personal data and processing, and taking into account exemptions) requirements that are hurdles to be overcome to render processing lawful. For processing to be lawful under the Directive as a whole, all the applicable hurdles must be overcome.
Necessary Conditions for Legitimate Processing of Personal Data and Sensitive Personal Data
Article 7 (see also Recital 30), which applies to all personal data, can be satisfied in six different ways a. by obtaining the unambiguous consent of the data subject, `consent' being defined by Article 2(h) as `any freely given specific and informed indication of his wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement to personal data relating to him being processed'; or 10
The Data Protection Directive and Medical Research Across Europe b. if processing is necessary to perform or enter a contract to which the data subject is party; or c. if processing is necessary to comply with a legal obligation of the data controller; or d. if processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject (which Recital 31 reveals to be interests `essential for the data subject's life'); or e. if processing is necessary in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority (in relation to which Recital 32 states that national legislation may determine who the controller performing a task carried out in the public interest should be); or f.
if processing is in the legitimate interests of the controller or recipients of the data (unless protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject is overriding) (with Recital 30 explaining that Member States may specify when this condition is satisfied).
With regard to Article 7(e) and 7(f) at least, Article 14(a) (see also Recital 45) specifies that these conditions may not be appealed to unless the data subject is given the opportunity to object on compelling legitimate grounds, unless `otherwise provided by national legislation'. with the `explicit consent' of the data subject (see also Recital 33) (which is not defined in the Directive) (unless national law does not permit the prohibition to be lifted by the data subject's consent); or where processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject or another person where the data subject physically or legally cannot give consent; or the processing is of data manifestly made public by the data subject or that is necessary to establish, exercise or defend a legal claim; or where the processing is necessary for the purposes of `preventive medicine, medical diagnosis, the provision of care or treatment or the management of health-care services, and where those data are processed by a health professional subject under national law or rules established by national competent bodies to the Article 8(7) provides that Member States must determine when personal data may be processed employing a national identification number or any other identifier of general application. Because Article 7 applies to all personal data, it is obvious that it is necessary for the processing of sensitive personal data that at least one condition from Article 7 as well as one condition from Article 8 be met. However, it is also obvious that meeting some of the conditions in Article 8 will automatically meet a condition in 35. The Court notes that the medical records in question contained highly personal and sensitive data about the applicant, including information relating to an abortion. Although the records remained confidential, they had been disclosed to another public authority and therefore to a wider circle of public servants (see paragraphs 12-13 above). Moreover. whilst the information had been collected and stored at the clinic in connection with medical treatment, its subsequent communication had served a different purpose, namely to enable the Office to examine her compensation claim. It did not follow from the fact that she had sought treatment at the clinic that she would consent to the data being disclosed to the Office (see paragraph 10 above). Having regard to these considerations, the Court finds that the accordance with the law when `necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others'. 6 However, this implies that consent must be obtained unless to do so would be impracticable/involve disproportionate effort or be otherwise inappropriate (e. g., because to do so would threaten the overriding rights of others). Consequently, it is at least arguable (and seems to me to be the case) that satisfaction of the conditions laid down by Articles 7 and 8(2) in ways that do not involve the consent of the data subject at least implicitly (as is the case, e. g., with the condition of being for a contract binding on the data subject) requires the obtaining of consent to be impracticable, etc. Only in the case of Article 8(2)(c) does it seem to me that this complex requirement will be satisfied automatically.
Provisions Relating to Journalism, Art and Literary Expression
Article 9 (see also Recital 37) permits exemptions or derogations from the Directive's requirements for processing `carried out solely for journalistic purposes or the purpose of artistic or literary expression' but only if this is necessary `to reconcile the right to privacy with the rules governing freedom of expression'. The relevance of this to medical research should be extremely limited.
Duty to Provide Information to the Data Subject
As a means to the protection of data subjects' rights to fundamental rights and freedoms, the Directive grants data subjects specific rights. In my opinion, first and foremost amongst these are the rights to information specified in Articles 10 and 11 (see also Recitals 38-40), which Recital 38 refers to as conditions of fair processing, which links these Articles to the is` data protection principle. Granted, the Directive does not describe the provisions of Articles 10 and 11 as rights of the data subject, but as duties of the data controller. However, because failure to carry out the applicable duty will interfere with the data subjects' specific rights, from a logical point of view these provisions may be characterized as rights, and the main effect of them being characterized as duties of the data controller is to indicate that the data controller's duty does not rest on the data subject making any claim: i. e., the information needs to be provided without the data subject having to make a request for it. Article 10 (see also Recital 38) covers the case where data are being collected from the data subject, whereas Article 11 covers cases where the data have not been obtained from the data subject. In both cases, the data controller or `his representative' must provide the data subject with information (except where he already has it) about the identity of the data controller and his representative (if any). In the case of Article 10, the data subject must also be informed about the intended purposes of the processing, whereas in the case of Article 11, the data subject must be informed of the purposes for which data have been or are to be disclosed. In both cases, the data subject must be given any other information required for the processing to be fair. Examples are given. In both cases, the recipients or categories of recipients, and the existence of the right of access to and the right to rectify the data concerning the data subject (granted by Article 12) are mentioned. In the case of Article 11, the requirement to provide this information may be lifted, in particular for statistical purposes or purposes of historical or scientific research, if the provision of information would be impossible or involve disproportionate effort or if recording or disclosure of the data is expressly laid down by law (see also Recital 40), subject to Member States providing adequate safeguards. However, information provision that falls under Article 10 is not explicitly stated to be open to such derogation. While Recitals 38-40 are, at least at first sight, ambiguous as to whether the derogations specified in Recital 40 apply to both the Recital 39 case (obtaining from the data subject) and the Recital 39 case (other cases) or only to the Recital 39 case, the fact that these derogations are only mentioned in connection with Article I1 in the operative part of the Directive indicates strongly that they apply only to the Recital 39/Article I1 case.
It is not at all clear whether Article 10 covers the case of a person who obtained personal data from the data subject and now wishes to use the data for a purpose or to make disclosures that the data subject was not informed about at the time that the data were obtained. The case for saying that it does is that Recital 38
states that purposes must be specified at the time of collection. However, Recital 39 states that exemptions parallel to those provided by Article 11(2) to Article 11(1) apply to disclosures that were not anticipated at the time of the collection. This creates considerable difficulties of interpretation, which I discuss in Chapter 6.
The reason why Articles 10 and 11 are at the core of the protection provided by the Directive is not only that information about the identity of the data controller, etc., is needed for data subjects to be able to exercise the other specific rights that the Directive grants them. If consent of the data subject is, at least as a matter of first presumption, necessary to satisfy the Article 7/8(2) requirement for legitimate processing in connection with sensitive personal data, then, because consent must be informed, information provision is necessary to satisfy the Article 7/8(2) requirement as well.
Power to Exempt from Article 10 and Other Provisions via Article 13 (1) Although there is no derogation from Article 10 explicitly specified within Article 10, it should, however, be noted that Article 13(1) provides for derogation from Articles 6(1), 10,11(1), 12, and 21 (which imposes a duty on Member States to publicize processing operations) to the extent that this is necessary to safeguard various goals (e. g., national security, defence, the detection and prosecution of crime, taxation policy) that are beyond the remit of EC law (see also Recitals 43 and 44), or (Article 13(1)(g)) to protect the data subject or the rights and freedoms of others (see also Recital 42 in relation to the rights of Articles 10,11 and 12).
(Related to this, Recital 70 states that the Directive allows the principle of public access to official documents [which reflects the ECHR Article 10(1) right to freedom of expression, because this includes the freedom to receive information] to be taken into account when implementing the principles set out in the Directive. ) It is important to note, however, that Article 28(4) requires Member States to provide for each national Supervisory Authority to hear, in particular, `claims for checks on the lawfulness of data processing lodged by any person when the national provisions pursuant to Article 13' of the Directive apply.
Data Subjects' Right of Access on Request
Article 12 (see also Recital 41) grants a `right of access', which includes rights to obtain from the data controller confirmation as to whether or not data relating to him or her are being processed and, if so, information at least about the purposes of the processing, the categories of data being processed, and the recipients or categories of recipients to whom the data have been disclosed; intelligible communication of what data are being processed and about the source of this data; knowledge of the logic behind any automated processing at least if covered by Article 15(1); -rectification, erasure or blocking of data if its processing does not comply with the Directive (especially on the grounds of inaccuracy or incompleteness); notification to third parties to whom data has been disclosed of the exercise of the last mentioned right (unless this is impossible or would involve disproportionate effort).
In relation to the modification of Article 12 permitted by Article 13(1)(g), Recital 42 specifically indicates that Member States may require the data subject's right of access to medical data to be exercised only through a health professional. Article 12 is also subject to derogation via Article 13(2) `when data are processed solely for the purposes of scientific research or are kept in personal form for a period that does not exceed the period necessary for the sole purpose of creating statistics', provided that -the derogation is by a legislative measure; `there is clearly no risk of breaching the privacy of the data subject'; and adequate legal safeguards are provided (in particular that the data are not used to take measures or decisions regarding any particular individual).
Data Subjects' Rights to Object Article 14(a) grants a right to object to processing on legitimate grounds (as already mentioned in connection with Article 7) and Article 14(b) grants a right to object to processing for the purposes of direct marketing. Whereas the Article 14(a) right may be removed by national legislation, the Article 14(b) may not and data subjects must be informed of this right (the exercise of which must be free of charge and [see Recital 30] does not require reasons to be given) either whenever the data controller envisages the data being processed for direct marketing or before such processing or disclosure to third parties for such processing occurs.
Data Subjects' Right to Object to Decisions Based Solely on Automated Processing
Article 15 (as already alluded to in connection with Article 12) grants data subjects a right not to be subjected to decisions that produce legal effects on them or otherwise significantly affect them, which are based solely on automated processing that is intended to evaluate personal aspects of the data subject (unless certain conditions are satisfied).
Powers to Exempt for Research
The extent to which the Directive permits Member States to exempt medical research from various requirements set by the Directive is (as a category of scientific research/use for statistics) specified at least by Article 13(2), together with Articles 6(1)(b), 6(1)(e), and 8(4) (given that Recital 34 specifies scientific research, amongst other things, is an important public interest). In addition, where processing was already under way before the Directive entered into force (24 October 1998), Article 32(3) permits Member States to provide, on condition that they institute appropriate safeguards, that the processing of data for the sole purpose of `historical research' (which category is not defined, in particular in relation to research for historical purposes, which is mentioned in Article 6(1)(b)) need not comply with Articles 6,7 and 8. To this might possibly be added the derogations permitted under Article 8(3) (but only to the extent that medical research may be considered to be a subcategory of preventive medicine, medical diagnosis, the provision of care or treatment, or management of health-care services) and the derogation under Article 13(1)(g) (but only to the extent that medical research is necessary to safeguard the data subject or the rights and freedoms of others). (The power to exempt for research is discussed in Chapter 5. ) 
Requirement to Provide Compensation for Damage Caused by Unlawful Processing
The Directive requires Member States, without prejudice to any administrative remedy, to provide for a judicial remedy for any breach of rights guaranteed by implementing national legislation (Article 22); to provide for compensation from the data controller for damage as a result of unlawful processing operations (except where the controller can prove that he was not responsible for the event causing the damage) (Article 23); and to adopt suitable measures to ensure full implementation of the provisions of the Directive, which must include sanctions for infringing these provisions (Article 24). (See also Recital 55. )
Transfer of Personal Data Outside the EEA Articles 25 and 26 concern transfer of personal data to `third countries' (i. e., countries outside the EEA). Personal data may not be transferred to a third country that does not provide for an adequate level of protection (Article 25(1); Recitals 56
and 57) unless with the unambiguous consent of the data subject; or when necessary for the performance of contractual measures between the data controller and the data subject, or at the data subject's request; or in the interest of the data subject in a contract between the controller and a third party; or when necessary or legally required on important public interest grounds or to exercise or defend legal claims; or when necessary in the vital interests of the data subject; or from a public register (Article 26(1); Recital 58). Alternatively, Member States may authorize transfers where the data controller adduces adequate safeguards by e. g., appropriate contracts (Article 26(2); Recital 59), in relation to which the Commission may, in accordance with Article 31(2), decide that certain standard contractual clauses constitute sufficient safeguards, with which Member States must comply (Article 26(4)). Article 25(2) specifies considerations that Member States must take into account in assessing the adequacy of protection in a third country. Member States and the Commission must inform each other of countries they consider do not provide adequate protection (Article 25(3) ). If the Commission does not consider protection in a third country to be adequate, Member States must act to prevent transfers of data of the type for which protection is not adequate to that country (Article 25(4)), while the Commission must act to try to remedy this situation (Article 25(5); Recital 59). The Commission may find, in accordance with Article 31(2), that a third country provides adequate protection, and then the Member States must comply with this decision (Article 25(6)). These matters are of special relevance in the case of personal data processed for medical research, because this research is often sponsored by companies based outside of the EEA, and, as Recital 60 indicates, non-compliance with the standards set by Article 8 of the Directive (which deals with sensitive personal data specifically) is of particular concern in relation to third countries. (As regards the powers of the Commission with regard to the transfer of data to third countries, see Recital 66, which makes reference to Council Decision 87/373/EEC. )
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